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ENERGY ECONOMICS: JUST COMPENSATION UNDER STATE
LAW IN TENNESSEE GAS PIPELINE COMPANY V.
PERMANENT EASEMENT FOR 7.053 ACRES
I. NATURAL GAS, PIPELINES, AND EMINENT DOMAIN:
AN INTRODUCTION
Natural gas is one of the most prevalent power sources pro-
duced in the United States.1  The domestic supply of natural gas
has substantially increased in recent years due to the advent of
fracking, resulting in a price decrease.2  Natural gas is also an abun-
dant resource and cleaner to burn than other energy sources.3  The
United States has quickly become the world’s largest producer of
natural gas and is a net exporter of the resource.4
After being withdrawn from oil wells, natural gas is processed
and distributed through various forms of pipelines.5  The United
States’ pipeline network is tremendously important because it trans-
ports fuels that are vital to the operation of daily life.6  Despite the
1. See Carolyn Elefant & Jennifer Flint, Summary of New Challenges to FERC Inter-
state Pipelines, THE AM. LAW INST. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. (Jan. 24-26, 2019) (ex-
plaining emergence of natural gas as dominant energy source); U.S. energy facts
explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/energy
explained/us-energy-facts/ (providing statistics regarding primary energy con-
sumption in United States).
2. See Elefant, supra note 1 (describing economic benefits of natural gas).
3. See Troutman Sanders Pipeline Practice, Global Energy Change: Increased Use
of Natural Gas and LNG, TROUTMAN SANDERS (June 28, 2018), https://www.pipelaws
.com/2018/06/global-energy-change-increased-use-natural-gas-lng/ (describing
non-economic benefits of natural gas).  For example, the “increased use of natural
gas in China is driven more by national goals to improve air quality than for mar-
ket reasons.” Id. (providing specific example of non-economic benefit of natural
gas).
4. See id. (analyzing U.S. production of natural gas); Natural gas imports and
exports, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/energyex
plained/natural-gas/imports-and-exports.php (providing import and export statis-
tics of natural gas).
5. See Natural gas explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 6, 2019), https://
www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/ (explaining production and delivery
of natural gas). The United States’ natural gas pipeline network has approximately
“[three] million miles of mainline and other pipelines that link natural gas pro-
duction areas and storage facilities with consumers.” See Natural gas pipelines, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natu
ral-gas/natural-gas-pipelines.php (providing information regarding the United
States’ pipeline network).
6. See Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Pipeline Basics,
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/PipelineBasics.htm?
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benefits of natural gas and the importance of energy distribution,
pipelines garner significant controversy.7  Notably, pipelines are in-
herently dangerous because they transport volatile fuels.8  They also
pose numerous environmental implications.9
In Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company v. Permanent Easement for 7.053
Acres,10 the Third Circuit explores a related issue regarding pipeline
construction: the delegation of the federal government’s eminent
domain power under the Natural Gas Act (NGA).11  Per Tennessee
Gas, state law governs the substantive determination of just compen-
sation when private entities exercise eminent domain under the
7. See id. (explaining importance of energy distribution). See, e.g., Keith
Goldberg, 3rd Circ. Says PennEast Can’t Take NJ Land For Pipeline, LAW360 (Sept. 10,
2019, 4:13 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1197303/3rd-circ-says-penn
east-can-t-take-nj-land-for-pipeline (illustrating controversy where Natural Gas Act
conflicts with state constitution); Keith Goldberg, FERC Outlines Enviro Harms From
$45B Alaska LNG Project, LAW360 (July 1, 2019, 3:54 PM), https://www.law360
.com/articles/1174496/ferc-outlines-enviro-harms-from-45b-alaska-lng-project (il-
lustrating controversy relating to environmental impacts of pipelines); Cynthia L.
Taub et al., New Executive Orders Aim to Reduce Federal and State Permitting Obstacles for
Pipeline and Energy Projects, STEPTOE & JOHNSON (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.step
toe.com/en/news-publications/new-executive-orders-aim-to-reduce-federal-and-
state-permitting-obstacles-for-pipeline-and-energy-projects.html (illustrating politi-
cal controversy related to pipeline construction).  For a further discussion of the
controversy surrounding pipelines, see infra notes 127-140 and accompanying text.
8. See Thomas G. Godfrey, Preparation for and Trial of a Gas Pipeline Leak and
Explosion Case, 25 AM. JUR. TRIALS 415 (Feb. 6, 2020) (describing explosive nature
of gas and related fuels). See, e.g., Jacey Fortin, After Gas Explosions in Massachusetts,
Gas Company Settles for $80 Million, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes
.com/2019/05/07/us/massachusetts-gas-explosion-settlement.html (describing
pipeline explosion in Massachusetts).  The pressure gauges on a Columbia Gas
pipeline were improperly disabled, which caused high pressure within the pipeline
and lead to an explosion. Id. (exemplifying inherent danger of pipelines).  At
least one death and twenty injuries resulted. Id. (indicating possible consequence
of pipeline explosion).
9. See, e.g., Megan O’Rourke, Comment, The Keystone XL Pipeline: Charting the
Course to Energy Security or Environmental Jeopardy?, 24 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 149, 158-65
(2013) (discussing potential oil spills, water contamination, damage to wildlife,
and greenhouse gas emissions from Keystone XL pipeline); Goldberg, supra note 7
(stating Alaskan pipeline project would affect wildlife, “permafrost, wetlands[,]
and forest”).  Oil spills related to pipeline failures pose dangers to wildlife and
water sources. See Heather Brady, 4 Key Impacts of the Keystone XL and Dakota Access
Pipelines, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.nationalgeographic
.com/news/2017/01/impact-keystone-dakota-access-pipeline-environment-global-
warming-oil-health/ (explaining environmental implications of pipelines).  Addi-
tionally, the use of pipelines may increase societal reliance on fossil fuels, which
could “delay investment in more renewable technologies.” See id. (proposing addi-
tional implication of pipelines).
10. 931 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2019) (introducing subject case of this Note).
11. See id. at 242-43 (explaining delegation of eminent domain power under
NGA). See also Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717w (2005) (providing short title of
legislation).
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NGA.12  But some state laws, such as Pennsylvania law, factor conse-
quential damages into just compensation.13  The Third Circuit’s
holding, therefore, exposes natural gas companies to significant fi-
nancial liability in states that permit condemnees to recover conse-
quential damages.14  Considering the inherent controversy
surrounding pipelines, consequential damages are a formidable
cost for natural gas companies.15
This Note examines the Third Circuit’s decision in Tennessee
Gas and its effect on condemnation proceedings brought by natural
gas companies.16  Likewise, this Note analyzes how pipeline implica-
tions may influence the determination of just compensation.17  Sec-
tion II sets out the facts and procedural framework underlying
Tennessee Gas.18  Section III provides background information that
is relevant to the legal dispute in this case.19  In light of this back-
ground, Section IV parses the Third Circuit’s rationale and briefly
discusses Judge Chagares’s dissenting opinion.20  Section V offers a
critical analysis of the Third Circuit’s opinion.21  Lastly, Section VI
discusses how this decision will impact the financial feasibility of
pipeline construction.22
12. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 255 (stating holding of Tennessee Gas).
13. See Marisa Fegan, Notes & Comments, Just Compensation Standards and Emi-
nent Domain Injustices: An Underexamined Connection and Opportunity for Reform, 6
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 269, 293-94 (2007) (noting states that have embraced statu-
tory reform to rectify “injustices of traditional just compensation law”). See, e.g.,
Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 242, 244-45 (stating Pennsylvania law permits recov-
ery of consequential damages in condemnation proceedings).
14. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 253 (identifying how various state laws
may impose additional condemnation costs).
15. For a discussion of how the controversy inherent to pipelines may impact
consequential damages, see infra notes 253-257 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s holding in Tennessee Gas and its
impact on condemnation proceedings brought by private entities under the NGA,
see infra notes 141-180, 247-264 and accompanying text.  For the purposes of clar-
ity throughout this Note, condemnation refers to the exercise of eminent domain.
See Condemnation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (providing definition
of condemnation).
17. For a discussion of pipeline implications influencing just compensation,
see infra notes 253-258 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the facts of Tennessee Gas, see infra notes 23-50 and
accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the legal background underpinning Tennessee Gas, see
infra notes 51-140 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s legal analysis in Tennessee Gas, see
infra notes 141-185 and accompanying text.
21. For a critical analysis of the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Tennessee Gas, see
infra notes 186-246 and accompanying text.
22. For discussion of the potential impact of Tennessee Gas, see infra notes 247-
264 and accompanying text.
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II. CASHING OUT: FACTS OF TENNESSEE GAS
The Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company (Tennessee Gas) devel-
ops natural gas pipelines across large expanses of land.23  Tennes-
see Gas is permitted to develop pipelines because it holds the
requisite “certificate of public convenience and necessity from the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission” (FERC).24  In the present
case, Tennessee Gas sought to develop a pipeline traversing “a 975-
acre tract of land in Pike County, Pennsylvania.”25  King Arthur Es-
tates (King Arthur), however, owned the land, and Tennessee Gas
failed to purchase easements to construct its pipeline.26  Accord-
ingly, Tennessee Gas filed a condemnation action to obtain prop-
erty rights to King Arthur’s land.27  Tennessee Gas may bring
condemnation actions under the NGA, which authorizes gas com-
panies “to acquire private property by eminent domain to con-
struct, operate, and maintain natural gas pipelines.”28
Just compensation must be provided when exercising the fed-
eral government’s eminent domain power.29  Tennessee Gas and
King Arthur agreed that the tract of land could be rightfully con-
demned for pipeline construction and subsequently estimated ap-
propriate compensation.30  Tennessee Gas calculated just
compensation under federal law, which does not permit recovery of
23. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres, 931
F.3d 237, 241, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2019) (referencing general business activities of
Tennessee Gas).
24. Id. at 241 (explaining why Tennessee Gas is permitted to construct pipe-
lines in Pennsylvania and New Jersey).  Natural gas companies must hold certifi-
cates of public convenience and necessity in order to rightfully take lands for
pipeline construction. See id. at 241, 243 (describing why FERC issues certificates
of public convenience and necessity).  The purpose of utilizing pipelines is to “aug-
ment . . . natural gas delivery capacity.” Id. (noting rationale for pipeline
development).
25. Id. at 241 (describing Tennessee Gas’s objective for bringing suit).
26. Id. (explaining Tennessee Gas’s actions prior to commencing condemna-
tion action).
27. See id. (demonstrating Tennessee Gas may exercise eminent domain
power if unable to obtain rights to land via easement).
28. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 242-43 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 717f(h)
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-56)) (providing Tennessee Gas with authority to
exercise Federal Government’s eminent domain power). For additional informa-
tion regarding the NGA, see infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
29. Id. at 243-44 (explaining concept of just compensation and its origin in
Fifth Amendment).
30. Id. at 241 (utilizing experts to determine various costs related to just com-
pensation).  When deciding appropriate compensation, both parties considered
“the value of the land before and after the taking, the value of the timber removed
from the land, professional fees, development costs, and timber replacement and
reforestation costs.” Id. (noting factors influencing determination of just compen-
sation).  Tennessee Gas then moved for summary judgment on the issue of com-
4
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consequential damages in eminent domain proceedings.31  Con-
versely, King Arthur relied on Pennsylvania law, which does permit
recovery of consequential damages in eminent domain
proceedings.32
Conflict arose because the NGA is silent on which law governs
just compensation.33  The parties were concerned with the gov-
erning law because the distinction resulted in a one-million dollar
difference in compensation.34  Tennessee Gas then moved for sum-
mary judgment on the issue of compensation.35  To support its mo-
tion, Tennessee Gas argued that condemnation proceedings are a
federal matter because eminent domain is a federal power
grounded in the Constitution.36  Tennessee Gas also noted that
“[j]ust compensation is measured by the fair market value of the
property interest taken, not by the value of the interest to the owner
or condemnor.”37  King Arthur filed a brief opposing Tennessee
Gas’s motion, arguing that a jury should consider consequential
damages.38
pensation. Id. at 241-42. (indicating procedural step after calculation of just
compensation).
31. See id. at 241-42 (explaining District Court found federal law ruled sub-
stantive determination of just compensation).  The District Court granted Tennes-
see Gas’s partial motion for summary judgment as to the issue of just
compensation. See id. at 242. (agreeing with Tennessee Gas’s application of federal
law).
32. See id. at 242 (noting King Arthur appealed district court’s ruling that
federal law governs substantive determination of just compensation in present dis-
pute); id. at 244-45 (describing inclusion of consequential damages under Penn-
sylvania state law).
33. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 243 (summarizing NGA does not speak to
“remedies available in the condemnation proceedings it allows”).
34. See id. at 253 (noting difference in compensation between state and fed-
eral law).  The Third Circuit summarizes the contention between the parties by
stating that “Pennsylvania law allows private property owners within the state to
obtain more money from condemnors than they could under federal law.” Id. at
245 (describing parties’ main source of disagreement).
35. Id. at 241-42 (recounting case’s procedural history).
36. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co.’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Mo-
tion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Certain of Def. King Arthur Estates, L.P.’s
Claims for Damages at 7-9, Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for
7.053 Acres, 931 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2019) (No. 3:12-cv-01477-ARC), 2016 WL
11219056 (citing cases where Third Circuit applied federal law to determine just
compensation in accordance with United States v. Miller).  For a further discussion
of Miller, see infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
37. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co.’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 36, at 6 (citing United States v. 15.3
Acres of Land, 15 F. Supp. 770, 784 (M.D. Pa. 1957) and United States v. Petty
Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377 (1946)) (employing narrow interpretation of fair
market value).
38. Brief of King Arthur Estates, L.P. in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment at 34-35, Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Ease-
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In addition to other arguments evidencing the applicability of
state law, King Arthur’s brief discussed a report from Dr. Steven
Vitale.39  Dr. Vitale’s report identified the environmental conse-
quences that would result if there was a pipeline explosion on King
Arthur’s property.40  Dr. Vitale calculated that the thermal radia-
tion from a pipeline explosion on King Arthur’s property would
have a potential impact radius of 896 feet.41  Additionally, Dr. Vitale
utilized a software created by the Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA) Office of Emergency Management to discern “the
effects of thermal radiation in the event of pipeline ruptures.”42
Among other consequences, Dr. Vitale determined “there is [a] po-
tential for death from thermal radiation within 60 seconds within
1461 feet” of Tennessee Gas’s pipeline, also known as the “threat
zone.”43
King Arthur specifically petitioned for consequential damages
to reflect the decreased marketability of its property resulting from
potential hazards.44  Moreover, King Arthur’s brief referenced that
a property naturally faces a “diminution in value” because of fear
associated with pipelines.45  King Arthur’s appraisal expert agreed
that Dr. Vitale’s findings quantify how a pipeline may affect the
market value of real estate.46  Neighboring properties within the
threat zone may similarly face property value issues.47
ment for 7.053 Acres, 931 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2019) (No. 3:12-CV-01477-ARC), 2016
WL 11219058 (summarizing King Arthur’s argument against Tennessee Gas’s
motion).
39. Id. at 31-34 (identifying one of King Arthur’s primary arguments opposing
Tennessee Gas’s motion).
40. Id. at 32-34 (identifying specific hazards associated with pipelines).
41. Id. at 31-32 (describing Dr. Vitale’s report and stating potential impact
radius is measured from pipeline’s point of rupture).
42. Id. at 32-33 (describing software used to identify effects of thermal radia-
tion).  The EPA’s Office of Emergency Management created its software in collab-
oration with the National Oceanic and Atmosphere Administration. Id. at 32
(naming creators of thermal energy software).
43. See Brief of King Arthur Estates, supra note 38, at 32-33 (detailing conse-
quences of thermal radiation resulting from pipeline explosion).  Dr. Vitale’s re-
port also determined that “[w]here the 1955 24” pipeline and the new 30” pipeline
co-exist, the potentially lethal distance is 1944 feet,” while thermal radiation would
create even broader threat zones for second-degree burns and pain. Id. at 32-33
(noting danger of thermal radiation resulting from pipeline explosion).
44. See id. at 33-34 (associating property values with danger posed by
pipelines).
45. Id. at 34 (explaining fears expressed by purchasers and owners of land
affected by pipelines).
46. Id. at 33 (referencing John McChesney’s opinion on value of King Ar-
thur’s property).
47. See id. at 33 (speculating public awareness of pipeline would negatively
impact King Arthur’s land and neighboring properties alike).
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The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
granted Tennessee Gas’s motion for summary judgment.48  On in-
terlocutory appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s
decision and held that state law governed the substantive determi-
nation of just compensation in this case.49 Circuit Judge Chagares
wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued for the applicability
of federal law.50
III. MAKING CENTS: A LEGAL BACKGROUND
The facts of Tennessee Gas compelled the Third Circuit to re-
solve the NGA’s silence on which law governs just compensation.51
This section begins with a discussion of the NGA, eminent domain,
and consequential damages.52  Next, this section will examine a va-
riety of case law relevant to the issue presented by Tennessee Gas.53
This section will then conclude with a general overview of pipelines
that addresses the controversy and opposition surrounding them.54
A. Natural Gas Act
Congress enacted the NGA upon finding that the transporta-
tion and sale of natural gas affect the public interest.55  The NGA
delegates regulation of such matters to an authoritative body.56
Congress currently vests regulatory authority of the transportation
48. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres, 931 F.3d
237, 242 (3d Cir. 2019) (recalling district court’s order regarding just compensa-
tion).  By granting part of Tennessee Gas’s motion, the district court denied state
law governed the substantive determination of just compensation in this case, thus
preventing King Arthur from receiving consequential damages. Id. (discussing dis-
trict court’s holding); see also Brief of King Arthur Estates, supra note 38, at 31-34
(requesting consequential damages to account for environmental and economic
implications of pipelines).
49. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 242, 255 (recalling case’s procedural history
and Third Circuit’s holding).
50. Id. at 255-59 (Chagares, J., dissenting) (arguing federal substantive law
applied in determining just compensation).
51. See id. at 242-47 (discussing legal principles relating to NGA, just compen-
sation, federal common lawmaking, and persuasive case law). See also id. at 247-55
(applying relevant law to facts of case).
52. For further discussion of the Natural Gas Act and related topics, see infra
notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
53. For further discussion of case law relevant to the issue presented by Tenn.
Gas, see infra notes 75-126 and accompanying text.
54. For further discussion of pipeline opposition and related controversy, see
infra notes 127-140 and accompanying text.
55. Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (2018) (explaining federal
regulation is necessary where business affects public interest).
56. See id. § 717b (imposing restrictions on transportation and sale of natural
gas).
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and sale of natural gas in the FERC.57  Among other functions, the
FERC may issue certificates of public convenience and necessity to
natural gas companies.58
Under the NGA, natural gas companies must obtain certifi-
cates of public convenience and necessity to condemn property for
pipeline construction.59  Likewise, natural gas companies must have
attempted to obtain property through contract or other methods
before exercising eminent domain.60  Natural gas companies may
bring condemnation actions because Congress has the authority to
delegate the federal government’s eminent domain power to pri-
vate entities through the NGA.61  The NGA is notably silent on the
issue of just compensation for condemnation actions.62
1. Eminent Domain and Just Compensation
Eminent domain refers to the government’s power to convert
private property for public use.63  The Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment instructs that the federal government must provide
just compensation when taking private property.64  Under federal
law, just compensation is strictly determined by “‘the fair market
value of the property on the date it is appropriated’ and nothing
more.”65  Where property is only partially condemned, federal law
57. 42 U.S.C. § 7171 (2018) (establishing FERC as independent regulatory
commission); see also Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for 7.053
Acres, 931 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining regulatory authority delegated
by NGA).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1) (2018) (vesting FERC with various regulatory
powers).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (2018) (discussing circumstances under which FERC
issues certificates of public convenience and necessity); see also Tenn. Gas Pipeline,
931 F.3d at 243 (stating “natural gas company must first successfully obtain” requi-
site certificate).
60. See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2018) (listing necessary step before commencing
condemnation action).
61. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 242 (explaining Tennessee Gas’s authority
to condemn private property).  Indeed, Congress may delegate the Federal Gov-
ernment’s eminent domain power to any private entity through its legislation. See
generally Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (affirming Congress may dele-
gate its eminent domain power).
62. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 243 (noting NGA does not speak to just
compensation despite permitting eminent domain).
63. Eminent Domain, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining emi-
nent domain).
64. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 243-44 (citing Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 467 U.S. 1, 9 (1984)) (explaining origin of just compensation).
65. Id. at 244 (quoting Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 10) (explaining how just com-
pensation is calculated under federal law).
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calculates just compensation by comparing the market value of
property before and after the partial taking.66
Pennsylvania law also calculates just compensation by compar-
ing the fair market value of property before and after the taking.67
Unlike federal law, however, Pennsylvania law permits just compen-
sation to include recovery of consequential damages and profes-
sional fees.68  Pennsylvania law broadens the definition of “fair
market value” to reflect modern appraisal theory, which considers
all evidentiary matters properly relating to value.69  Pennsylvania’s
inclusive approach to just compensation, therefore, requires con-
demnors to pay more than under federal law when exercising emi-
nent domain over private property.70
2. Consequential Damages
Consequential damages are awarded for “[l]osses that do not
flow directly and immediately from an injurious act.”71  In eminent
domain proceedings, typical examples of consequential damages
include “lost future profits, lost business goodwill . . . , moving ex-
penses, and attorneys [sic] fees.”72  Calculation of fair market value
excludes indemnification of consequential damages unless state law
66. See id. at 244 (quoting United States v. 68.94 Acres of Land, 918 F.2d 389,
393 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990)) (clarifying how federal law determines just compensation
when property is partially condemned).  Pipeline construction may constitute a
partial taking. Id. (describing procedure for partial takings).  Consistent with the
formula set forth by federal law, any benefits to property from partial takings may
offset total compensation. See id. (describing various scenarios related to compen-
sation for partial takings).
67. Id. (citing 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 702(a) (2006)) (explaining Pennsylvania’s
own “remedial scheme” for condemnation proceedings within its borders).  Penn-
sylvania law is the applicable state law, as King Arthur’s tract of land lies in Pike
County, Pennsylvania. See id. at 241, 244 (describing applicability of Pennsylvania
state law).
68. Id. at 244-45 (citing 26 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 703, 710 (2006)) (demonstrat-
ing Pennsylvania law allows greater recovery than federal law).
69. See 26 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 706 (JT. ST. GOVT. COMM. eds.)
(West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. Act 91) (noting legislative intent underly-
ing each clause of Section 703).  The Editors’ Notes to Section 703 express their
intention to “enlarge the traditional definition of fair market value.” See id. (ex-
plaining factors influencing fair market value).
70. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 245 (highlighting consequence of Penn-
sylvania’s inclusive approach to just compensation).  “On the whole, then, Penn-
sylvania state law allows private property owners within the state to obtain more
money from condemnors than they could under federal law.” Id. (describing addi-
tional costs that Pennsylvania law imposes on condemnors).
71. Damages, Consequential Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
(providing definition of consequential damages).
72. Thomas W. Merrill, Colloquium Article, Incomplete Compensation for Tak-
ings, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 110, 118 (2002) (listing examples of consequential
damages).
9
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requires otherwise.73  Although legal scholars have studied the vari-
ous approaches to valuation for the purposes of just compensation,
it is still difficult to value abstract costs that may influence conse-
quential damages.74
B. Kimbell Foods: Federal Law or State Law?
Federal courts interpret “the interstices of federal legislation
‘according to their own standards.’”75  The product of this interpre-
tation, known as “federal common law,” obliges the court to create
a uniform federal law or adopt the relevant state law.76  Determin-
ing whether to implement federal or state law is a function of the
following three factors proposed by United States v. Kimbell Foods,
Inc.:77 “(1) whether the federal program, by its very nature, re-
quire[s] uniformity[,] (2) whether application of state law would
frustrate specific objectives of the federal program[,] and (3)
whether application of uniform federal law would disrupt existing
commercial relationships predicated on state law.”78
In Kimbell Foods, although the U.S. Supreme Court held that
federal law governed the relevant controversy, the Court still
adopted state law as the federal standard because a nationwide fed-
eral rule was unnecessary.79  The Court reasoned that controversies
related to federal programs do not automatically require adoption
73. Christopher Serkin, Article, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensa-
tion for Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. L. REV. 677, 678-79 (2005) (explaining tradi-
tional fair market value calculation excludes “whole categories of damages”).  The
fair market value standard is generally criticized for providing inadequate compen-
sation. See id. (highlighting fair market value overlooks “real but subjective
harms”).  As a result, several states require just compensation to reflect conse-
quential damages. See id. at 742 n.47 (listing case law supporting inclusion of con-
sequential damages). See also Fegan, supra note 13, at 296 (noting instances of
state law permitting recovery of consequential damages).
74. See Serkin, supra note 73, at 688 (noting benefits of environmental and
land use regulation are difficult to value but “no less real”).
75. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979) (quoting
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)) (outlining federal
procedure when Congress is silent or unclear).
76. Id. at 718 (defining two approaches to federal gap-filling); Tenn. Gas
Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres, 931 F.3d 237, 245-46 (3d Cir.
2019) (explaining “federal common law”).
77. 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (introducing factors proposed by Kimbell Foods).
78. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 245-46 (citing Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-
29) (summarizing three factors balanced in Kimbell Foods). See, e.g., Columbia Gas
Transmission Corp. v. Exclusive Nat. Gas Storage Easement, 962 F.2d 1192, 1198-
99 (6th Cir. 1992) (analyzing facts using Kimbell Foods factors).
79. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 718 (explaining Court’s holding).
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of a uniform federal rule.80  Rather, courts must consider how ap-
plying state law would affect relevant governmental interests.81
The first Kimbell Foods factor addresses whether there is a need
for a “nationally uniform body of law.”82  The Court reasoned that
existing state laws sufficiently protected the federal interest in Kim-
bell Foods and, further, that uniformity was not essential to the ad-
ministration of federal programs.83  The second Kimbell Foods factor
considers whether “application of state law would frustrate specific
objectives of the federal programs.”84  Although the government ar-
gued that state law was an insufficient safeguard in Kimbell Foods, the
Court disagreed and held that state law did not frustrate the gov-
ernment’s objectives.85  Lastly, the third Kimbell Foods factor ques-
tions the extent to which a uniform federal law would affect
“commercial relationships predicated on state law.”86  The Court
firmly held that imposing federal doctrines could impact the stabil-
ity engendered by state law.87  Altogether, the Court’s reasoning in
Kimbell Foods demonstrates the severe implications of fashioning a
uniform federal rule to resolve incomplete federal statutes.88
C. United States v. Miller
Conversely, the Supreme Court has also held that federal law
may govern the substantive determination of just compensation.89
In United States v. Miller,90 the United States condemned private
land to relocate and construct railroad tracks for the Central Pacific
80. Id. at 727-28 (prefacing why Court did not automatically create uniform
federal rule).
81. Id. at 728 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 310
(1947)) (explaining how courts decide whether to use state or federal law as fed-
eral common law).
82. Id. (explaining Court’s first consideration).
83. See id. at 729-33 (illustrating federal program does not require
uniformity).
84. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 (explaining Court’s second consideration).
85. Id. at 733-38 (clarifying why application of state law would not frustrate
government’s objectives).
86. Id. at 728-29 (explaining Court’s third consideration).
87. Id. at 739-40 (illustrating how uniform federal law could substantially im-
pact existing commercial relationships).
88. See id. at 729-40 (explaining why implementation of state law is sufficient
to resolve incomplete federal statutes); Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Ease-
ment for 7.053 Acres, 931 F.3d 237, 245-46 (3d Cir. 2019) (summarizing holding in
Kimbell Foods).
89. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 247 (stating holding in United States v.
Miller).
90. 317 U.S. 369 (1943) (holding federal law governs substantive determina-
tion of just compensation in eminent domain actions brought by Federal
Government).
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Railroad.91  Expectedly, the property owners disagreed with the
government’s estimation of just compensation.92  The property
owners appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which determined
state law “could not[ ] affect questions of substantive right . . . such
as the measure of compensation” in condemnation proceedings.93
Further, the federal statutes relevant to the issue in Miller only
required the Court to implement state procedural law.94  It is essen-
tial to note that the Court’s holding in Miller applies to eminent
domain proceedings specifically exercised by the federal govern-
ment.95 Miller, therefore, is only instructive when determining “the
amount of compensation due an owner of land condemned by the
United States.”96
D. Kelo v. City of New London
In Kelo v. City of New London,97 the U.S. Supreme Court deter-
mined whether economic development qualifies as a “public pur-
pose” under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.98  The Takings
Clause sets forth that “private property [shall not] be taken for pub-
lic use, without just compensation.”99  Although the Takings Clause
expressly states “public use,” the Kelo Court reasoned that “public
purpose” is a more practical metric.100
91. Id. at 370-71 (providing relevant facts of Miller).
92. Id. at 371-72 (noting respondents provided evidence as to proper fair mar-
ket value to oppose government’s estimation).
93. Id. at 380 (denying application of state law to substantive determination of
just compensation).
94. Id. at 379-80 (explaining only purpose of state law in substantive
determination).
95. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres, 931 F.3d
237, 248 (3d Cir. 2019) (noting limitation on Court’s holding).  “Indeed, Miller
itself only concerned a condemnation by the [F]ederal [G]overnment.” Id. (nar-
rowing breadth of Miller).
96. Id. (quoting United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Phila., 144 F.2d
626, 629 (3d Cir. 1944) (emphasis added)) (noting how Miller is distinguishable
from Tenn. Gas Pipeline).
97. 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding economic development qualifies as “public
use” under Takings Clause).
98. See id. at 483-90 (providing Court’s analysis).
99. Id. at 496 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V)
(referencing relevant clause of Fifth Amendment).
100. Id. at 477-80 (interpreting “public use” requirement of Fifth Amendment
to mean “public purpose”).  The Court refused to narrowly construe the meaning
of “public use” under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 480
(stating Court has employed broader meaning of “public use” since 19th century).
Condemned property can be taken for a public purpose without actually being
used by the public. See id. at 479-80 (quoting Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,
467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984)) (rejecting “any literal requirement that condemned
property be put into use for the general public”).  The Court referenced its own
12
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The City of New London was targeted for redevelopment after
facing years of economic hardship.101  The City appointed the New
London Development Corporation (NLDC), a private entity, as its
“development agent” in charge of the revitalization plan.102  To ef-
fectuate its plan, the City authorized the NLDC “to acquire prop-
erty by exercising eminent domain in the City’s name.”103  The
NLDC, however, faced opposition when it condemned residential
properties lying within the development area.104  Specifically, the
residents argued that economic redevelopment does not constitute
a “public use” under the Takings Clause.105  The Court granted cer-
tiorari and found that economic development fits within the broad
definition of “public purpose.”106
E. Persuasive Precedent
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have both held that state law
should govern the determination of just compensation in condem-
nation proceedings brought by private entities.107  In Georgia Power
Company v. Sanders,108 the Fifth Circuit encountered a statutory gap
which prompted analysis of Supreme Court precedent.109  The
Fifth Circuit premised its analysis on the idea that “state law should
supply the federal rule unless there is an expression of legislative
intent to the contrary, or . . . a showing that state law conflicts signif-
icantly with any federal interests or policies present in [a] case.”110
This presumption in favor of state law reflects a trend among Su-
precedent, which exemplified that a public purpose may exist absent public use, to
support its conclusion. See id. at 480 (citing Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Min.
Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906)) (referencing relevant precedent).
101. Id. at 473-75 (providing factual basis relevant to present discussion).
102. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473-75 (introducing NLDC as party).
103. Id. at 475 (explaining New London’s delegation of eminent domain
power).
104. Id. at 475-76 (summarizing Susette Kelo and Wilhelmina Dery’s stories).
105. Id. at 475-77 (explaining basis of lawsuit and procedural posture of case).
106. Id. at 477, 484 (stating relevant case law is largely deferential to legisla-
tive judgment).  To support its holding, the Court discussed an array of case law.
See generally id. at 480-82 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Haw. Hous.
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); and Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
986 (1984)).
107. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres, 931 F.3d
237, 246-47 (3d Cir. 2019) (referencing persuasive precedent from Fifth and Sixth
Circuits).
108. 617 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (deciding whether federal or
state law should be implemented as federal rule).
109. Id. at 1128 (Fay, J., concurring) (noting judiciary’s role to fill legislative
gaps).
110. Id. at 1115-16 (citing Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68
(1966)) (explaining court’s general reasoning).
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preme Court precedent illustrating “a growing desire to minimize
displacement of state law.”111  Although Georgia Power discusses the
present issue in terms of waterways rather than pipelines, the Fifth
Circuit still holds that imposing state law as the federal rule does
not jeopardize the United States’ interests.112  This case is persua-
sive because the relevant statute’s text is similar to the NGA.113
In Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation v. Exclusive Natural Gas
Storage Easement,114 the Sixth Circuit evaluated a case where a natu-
ral gas company exercised its eminent domain power in Ohio.115
The company commenced its condemnation action under the
NGA, leading to the same issue in Tennessee Gas: whether a uniform
federal law or existing state law should govern the statutory gap re-
garding just compensation under the NGA.116  Considering prior
precedent, the Sixth Circuit noted “an inclination to adopt state law
as the federal standard where a private party brings a federal cause
of action implicating areas of traditionally state concern.”117  Ac-
cordingly, the Sixth Circuit implemented state law as the federal
rule.118  The court found the reasoning in Georgia Power to be in-
structive and supported its holding with analysis of the Kimbell Foods
factors.119  The Sixth Circuit also noted that property rights
111. See id. at 1118 (quoting Ga. Power Co. v. 54.20 Acres of Land, 563 F.2d
1178, 1189 (5th Cir. 1977)) (supporting Fifth Circuit’s decision to impose state law
as federal rule).  The Fifth Circuit analyzed multiple Supreme Court cases, includ-
ing Kimbell Foods, to support its conclusion. See id. at 1116-18 (demonstrating other
circuit courts have utilized Kimbell Foods analysis).
112. See id. at 1118, 1124 (providing Fifth Circuit’s holding). Georgia Power
discusses the present issue in terms of the Federal Power Act. See id. (noting dis-
tinction between Tennessee Gas and Georgia Power).
113. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres, 931 F.3d
237, 246 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining similarities between Federal Power Act and
NGA).
114. 962 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1992) (incorporating state law as federal
standard).
115. Id. at 1193 (providing facts of case).
116. See id. at 1193-94 (explaining issue before Sixth Circuit).
117. Id. at 1196 (summarizing Sixth Circuit’s typical approach to resolving
this general issue).
118. Id. at 1194-96, 1198-99 (supplying Sixth Circuit’s reasoning for its
holding).
119. Columbia Gas, 962 F.2d at 1198 (explaining Sixth Circuit’s reliance on
Georgia Power).  Specifically analyzing the Kimbell Foods factors, the Sixth Circuit
found “that (1) it is unnecessary to fashion a nationally uniform rule of compensa-
tion for private parties condemning land under the NGA, (2) incorporating state
law as the federal standard would not frustrate the specific objectives of the NGA,
and (3) property rights have traditionally been defined by the state law.”  Tenn.
Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres, 931 F.3d 237, 246-47 (3d
Cir. 2019) (summarizing Sixth Circuit’s analysis of Kimbell Foods factors in Columbia
Gas).
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have “traditionally been . . . defined in substantial part by state
law.”120
Conversely, the Second Circuit decided in National Railroad
Passenger Corporation v. Two Parcels of Land121 to implement a uni-
form federal law instead of state law.122  In National Railroad Passen-
ger, a railroad corporation (Amtrak) partially condemned private
property in Connecticut.123  Unlike Tennessee Gas, determining just
compensation under state law in National Railroad Passenger caused
the condemnor to face other statutory obstacles in addition to
higher condemnation costs.124  Incorporating state law as the fed-
eral standard would have notably forced Amtrak to apply for nu-
merous zoning ordinances.125 The Second Circuit subsequently
decided to affirm the district court’s decision to implement a uni-
form federal law.126
F. Pipeline Opposition and Controversy
Opposition to pipelines has amplified in recent years.127  Ac-
cordingly, pipeline opponents have sought new ways to generally
challenge the approval and construction of natural gas pipelines.128
120. Columbia Gas, 962 F.2d at 1198 (explaining how uniform federal rule
would affect traditional property rights).  The Sixth Circuit considers that imple-
menting a uniform federal rule could negatively impact “well-developed state
property regime[s].” See id. (stating court’s position regarding danger of uniform
federal rule).
121. 822 F.2d 1261 (2d Cir. 1987) (deciding to fashion uniform federal rule).
122. Id. at 1267 (noting facts of National Railroad Passenger were distinguisha-
ble from Georgia Power).
123. Id. at 1262-64 (providing facts of similar case).
124. Id. at 1267 (summarizing other statutory obligations faced by
condemnor).
125. Id. (evidencing one statutory obstacle in addition to higher condemna-
tion costs).  “Under Connecticut law, a partial taking rendering excess property
nonconforming under local zoning laws requires the condemnor to apply for a
variance prior to the taking . . . .” Id. (illustrating Connecticut zoning law require-
ment).  If Amtrak was unable to obtain the requisite zoning ordinances, it would
have been forced to pay for entire parcels regardless of the amount of land con-
demned. Id. (stating consequence under Connecticut law).
126. National Railroad Passenger, 822 F.2d at 1267 (providing case’s holding).
127. See generally Elefant, supra note 1 (summarizing recent response to
pipelines).
128. See id. (stating various strategies by which opponents challenge natural
gas pipelines).  Pipeline challenges cover a wide range of legal action and oppo-
nents have attempted to challenge pipelines under a variety of legal theories. See
id. (categorizing types of pipeline challenges).  Opponents have even resorted to
challenging pipelines on the basis of zoning. See generally Del. Riverkeeper Net-
work v. Sunoco Pipeline L.P., 179 A.3d 670, 699 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018) (holding
construction of pipeline did not violate residential zoning ordinance); Preemption/
Pipeline–Opponents say pipeline construction in residential districts in township violate
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Landowners have specifically attempted to challenge the ability of
natural gas companies to exercise eminent domain.129
Upon filing a condemnation complaint, most pipeline compa-
nies seek immediate possession of land by filing a partial motion for
summary judgment.130  Although it is difficult to stop the immedi-
ate taking at the trial court level, landowners have recently em-
ployed the following arguments to challenge condemnation
proceedings: (1) separation of powers, (2) failure to satisfy factors
for injunctive relief, (3) lack of good faith negotiation, (4) no sub-
stantive right due to lack of permits, and (5) petitions to vacate
injunction.131  Further, landowners have asserted two categories of
environmental challenges to condemnation proceedings: (1) Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act challenges to certificates of public
convenience and necessity issued by the FERC and (2) challenges
to federally mandated environmental authorizations.132
The motivation for landowners to challenge pipeline construc-
tion is situational; some landowners may simply have a sentimental
connection to their land.133  Other landowners may be concerned
by the potential danger and environmental risks pipelines pose.134
As pipelines often traverse large expanses of land across multiple
states, their length amplifies these risks.135  Likewise, the expansive
nature of pipeline construction projects may lead to numerous con-
demnation proceedings throughout the course of a single
project.136
township’s zoning ordinance, 12 No. 8 QUINLAN, ZONING BULL. NL 2 (Apr. 25, 2018)
(explaining decision in Del. Riverkeeper).
129. See Elefant, supra note 1 (prefacing arguments used in recent years by
pipeline opponents).
130. Id. (explaining typical procedure of pipeline companies in condemna-
tion proceedings).
131. Id. (summarizing arguments that landowners typically employ to combat
condemnation proceedings).
132. See id. (providing additional arguments utilized by pipeline opponents).
133. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005) (noting
one petitioner prized her home for its water view and another petitioner lived in
her home for more than sixty years).
134. For a discussion of the danger and environmental hazards posed by pipe-
lines, see supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 152 (stating Keystone XL pipeline
would extend through Montana, South Dakota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas);
Natural Gas Pipelines, KINDER MORGAN, https://www.kindermorgan.com/pages/
business/gas_pipelines/east/TGP/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 14, 2020) (stat-
ing, “Tennessee Gas Pipeline is an approximately 11,750-mile pipeline system that
transports natural gas from Louisiana, the Gulf of Mexico and south Texas to the
northeast section of the United States”).
136. See, e.g., O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 168-69 (stating utility company build-
ing Keystone XL pipeline faced fifty-six eminent domain actions in just two states).
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Despite the surrounding controversy, pipeline construction is
an attractive investment for natural gas companies because pipe-
lines reward a higher rate of return than other utilities.137  Conse-
quently, the United States’ pipeline network is overbuilt because
pipeline projects draw a surplus of capital.138  As natural gas compa-
nies compete to create better pipeline networks, any financial risk
associated with overbuilding can be pushed to their “captive rate-
payers.”139  It is possible, however, that overbuilding may eventually
challenge the profitability and financial feasibility of pipeline
projects.140
IV. PAY UP: THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS
In this case, the Third Circuit resorted to common lawmaking
because the NGA does not “provide a federal rule of decision as to
the appropriate compensation owed to condemnees under the stat-
ute.”141  Although exercising eminent domain is a matter of federal
law, and “the NGA is a federal statute implementing a nationwide
federal program,” the judiciary must speak because there is a gap in
the statutory scheme.142  To resolve this gap, the Third Circuit had
137. See Cathy Kunkel, Two Pipeline Expansion Projects in Appalachia Indicate a
Rush Toward Overbuilding, INST. FOR ENERGY ECON. & FIN. ANALYSIS (Apr. 27, 2016),
http://ieefa.org/two-pipeline-expansion-projects-appalachia-indicate-rush-toward-
overbuilding/ (comparing pipeline rates of return to other utilities).
138. See id. (indicating tendency toward overbuilding due to financial appeal
of pipeline construction).
139. See id. (explaining further financial rationale for pipeline overbuilding).
140. See, e.g., Cathy Kunkel & Lorne Stockman, The Vanishing Need for the At-
lantic Coast Pipeline, INST. FOR ENERGY ECON. & FIN. ANALYSIS (Jan. 2019), http://
ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Atlantic-Coast-Pipeline_January-2019.pdf
(proposing consequence of overbuilding pipelines).  Regulated utilities must have
their utility costs approved by state commissions. Id. (indicating that utilities are
regulated at state level).  Although utility companies may be able to push the costs
of pipeline overbuilding onto ratepayers, they will not be able to recover such costs
if their rates are too high and, therefore, not approved by the state. See id. (balanc-
ing pipeline construction against consumer protection).  The cost of a pipeline
project may reach such an amount that it no longer represents good value to rate-
payers. See id. (noting when state may not approve rates).
141. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres, 931
F.3d 237, 245-46, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2019) (noting federal courts must gap-fill when
Congress has not expressly spoken via statute).  Common lawmaking permits fed-
eral courts to develop “legally binding federal rules” when a constitutional or statu-
tory provision is unclear. Id. (describing common lawmaking).  Federal courts
may partake in common lawmaking because it is impossible for legislators to antici-
pate every application of a particular statutory provision. Id. at 245 (providing
rationale for common lawmaking).
142. Id. at 247 (explaining inherent connection to federal law is not conclu-
sive).  “[W]here federal law governs a controversy but there is no federal rule of
decision on a particular matter, a federal court must fill the void through common
lawmaking . . . .” Id. at 246 (referring to application of Kimbell Foods).  The gap in
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two options in this dispute: (1) adopt the relevant state law or (2)
create and impose a nationwide federal rule.143
A. Application of Kimbell Foods
The Third Circuit prefaced its analysis by presuming state law
should be incorporated as the federal rule “unless there is an ex-
pression of legislative intent to the contrary or a showing that state
law significantly conflicts with the federal interest present.”144  As
incorporation of state law frustrated neither of these objectives, the
Third Circuit presumed that state law should be the present stan-
dard.145  Nonetheless, the court struggled with its determination
because no binding case law existed with regard to private entities
in this situation.146  The Third Circuit weighed the three factors set
forth by Kimbell Foods to confirm that state law should govern the
substantive determination of just compensation in this case.147
1. Kimbell Foods Factor #1
The first factor from Kimbell Foods questions whether the fed-
eral program requires uniformity.148  The Third Circuit cited nu-
merous reasons why a nationally uniform rule was unnecessary to
resolve the issue in Tennessee Gas.149  The court foremost noted the
federal interest in a uniform rule was weak because the United
States was not a party to the case.150  As the present case was be-
the NGA’s statutory scheme is the operative fact in this case. See id. (noting prece-
dential issue before Third Circuit).  The court would not have to decide the gov-
erning law if there was not a gap in the statutory scheme. See id. at 247 (explaining
why Third Circuit must “resort to the Kimbell Foods analysis”).
143. Id. at 245 (citing Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367
(1943)) (explaining how federal courts may proceed with common lawmaking).
When determining federal common law, a federal court does not necessarily have
to produce a uniform federal rule. Id. (clarifying federal courts may adopt state
law).
144. Id. at 250 (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 739
(1979)) (explaining general presumption that state law should typically be incor-
porated as federal standard).
145. Id. at 250-51 (providing Third Circuit’s perspective while applying Kim-
bell Foods analysis).
146. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 248 (discussing how present case differs
from cases referenced by Tennessee Gas).
147. See id. at 250-55 (weighing three factors from Kimbell Foods to determine
if federal or state law applies).
148. For a discussion of Kimbell Foods and its three-factor analysis, see supra
notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
149. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 251-52 (stating five reasons in opposition
to nationally uniform rule).
150. Id. at 251 (noting absence of federal interest where United States acts
through licensee).
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tween two private entities, their dispute did “‘not touch the rights
and duties of the United States’. . . .”151  Relatedly, the Supreme
Court has held that federal law should not arrogate state law in
cases involving transactions of local concern.152  The Third Circuit
decided the federal interest was also faint because property rights
are typically governed by state law.153
The court next observed that “the NGA contemplates state par-
ticipation in multiple ways. . . .”154  For example, the NGA allows
states to regulate environmental affairs related to natural gas facili-
ties even if the facilities are part of interstate activities.155  The NGA
also permits condemnors to file eminent domain actions in state
court.156  Procedural uniformity among eminent domain actions is
guaranteed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1, which further
indicates the redundancy of a nationwide federal rule.157  Lastly,
the Third Circuit reasoned that any inequity borne from applying
divergent state law is irrelevant to the present determination.158
Fairness is not the objective of the first Kimbell Foods factor.159 Based
on this reasoning, the Third Circuit concluded the first factor in
the Kimbell Foods analysis weighed in favor of incorporating state
law.160
2. Kimbell Foods Factor #2
The second factor from Kimbell Foods considers whether apply-
ing state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal pro-
151. Id. (quoting Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29,
33-34 (1956)) (stating cases between private parties are remote from federal
interest).
152. See id. (citing Parnell, 352 U.S. at 33-34) (drawing conclusion that dispute
is of local concern if it does not affect duty of United States).
153. Id. at 251-52 (explaining federal rule would add unnecessary complexity
to state property laws).
154. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 252 (noting role of state law in NGA).
155. Id. (citing Twp. Of Bordentown, N.J. v. FERC, 903 F.3d 234, 268 (3d Cir.
2018)) (providing one example of state law’s role in NGA). See also Natural Gas
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717b(d) (2005) (excluding certain environmental laws from cov-
erage of NGA).
156. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 252 (providing an additional example of
state law’s role in NGA).
157. Id. at 241, 252 (discussing sufficient procedural uniformity in eminent
domain actions provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1).
158. Id. at 252 (rebutting Tennessee Gas’s primary argument regarding first
Kimbell Foods factor).
159. See id. (reinforcing first Kimbell Foods factor is solely concerned with
uniformity).
160. Id. (stating Third Circuit’s conclusion as to first Kimbell Foods factor).
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gram.161  The Third Circuit began analyzing this factor by
identifying the objectives of the NGA, which are “matters relating to
the transportation of natural gas and the sale thereof.”162  The
Third Circuit stated that protecting the financial interests of natural
gas companies is not an NGA objective.163  Increased condemna-
tion costs for Tennessee Gas were the only effects of applying state
law in the present case.164  The Third Circuit reasoned that incor-
porating state law would not frustrate the NGA’s objectives because
the NGA is unconcerned with Tennessee Gas’s financial
interests.165
The Third Circuit distinguished National Railroad Passenger to
support its conclusion.166  Specifically, the Third Circuit noted in-
corporating state law in National Railroad Passenger would have insti-
tuted statutory obligations beyond higher condemnation costs.167
The Third Circuit reported Tennessee Gas could not provide any
additional precedent evidencing state law “so far out of step with
federal law as to create a significant conflict.”168  The Third Circuit
concluded the second factor weighed in favor of incorporating state
law.169
161. For a discussion of Kimbell Foods and its three-factor analysis, see supra
notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
162. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 253 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 717(a)) (summa-
rizing NGA’s objectives).
163. Id. (citing Sunray Mid-continent Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 364 U.S.
137, 147 (1960)) (addressing financial interests of natural gas companies).  In fact,
one of the NGA’s primary objectives is protecting consumers from exploitation by
natural gas companies. Id. (explaining why financial interests of natural gas com-
panies are not considered under NGA).
164. Id. (discussing effect of applying Pennsylvania law).  For information re-
garding the financial difference between imposing federal and state law, see supra
notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
165. Id. at 253 (quoting In re Columbia Gas, 997 F.2d 1039, 1058 (3d Cir.
1993)) (explaining condemnor’s financial burden is merely an “ancillary issue”).
166. Id. at 253-54 (distinguishing Second Circuit’s decision to implement uni-
form federal rule).
167. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 254 (noting additional statutory obliga-
tions are non-existent in present case).  For a discussion of the additional statutory
obligations imposed by state law in National Railroad Passenger, see supra notes 124-
125 and accompanying text.
168. Id. at 254 (indicating National Railroad Passenger was Tennessee Gas’s only
viable argument under second Kimbell Foods factor).  Additionally, the Third Cir-
cuit expressly clarified that Tennessee Gas could not provide “any further, con-
crete examples of significantly divergent state laws that could frustrate the NGA’s
purpose of protecting the public interest.” Id. (inferring divergent state laws are
uncommon).
169. Id. (stating Third Circuit’s conclusion as to second Kimbell Foods factor).
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3. Kimbell Foods Factor #3
The third and final factor from Kimbell Foods considers whether
“a uniform federal rule would upset commercial expectations
founded on state law.”170  Reasoning that property rights are typi-
cally a matter of state law, the Third Circuit held related commer-
cial relationships are rightfully grounded therein.171  The Third
Circuit, however, acknowledged the federal body of law regarding
just compensation.172  So although property generally invokes state
law, parties to commercial relationships involving property are still
“on notice of the potential application of federal law.”173  The
Third Circuit concluded the third factor weighed in favor of state
law because incorporating federal law could upset commercial ex-
pectations “based upon ‘the already well-developed state property
regime.’”174
B. Distinguishing Miller
The Third Circuit applied the Kimbell Foods analysis after deter-
mining Miller was distinguishable.175  Although Miller is still binding
precedent in eminent domain actions brought by the federal gov-
ernment, the Third Circuit refused to extend its reach to private
entities in Tennessee Gas.176  The Third Circuit relied on two reasons
to support its decision: (1) developing natural gas pipelines is not a
governmental function, and (2) private entities use private funding
to pay just compensation in eminent domain proceedings.177  Re-
garding the first reason, the federal interest in pipeline develop-
170. Id. (introducing third Kimbell Foods factor).  For a discussion of Kimbell
Foods and its three-factor analysis, see supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
171. Id. at 254 (noting property rights are traditionally left to states).
172. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d (establishing omnipresence of federal law).
173. Id. (identifying position of federal precedent among state property law).
174. Id. at 254-55 (quoting Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Exclusive
Nat. Gas Storage Easement, 962 F.2d 1192, 1198 (6th Cir. 1992)) (stating Third
Circuit’s conclusion as to third Kimbell Foods factor).  When presenting its conclu-
sion, the court noted the balance between federal and state law under this factor is
close. Id. at 254 (describing court’s rationale).
175. Id. at 247-49 (explaining why Third Circuit conducted Kimbell Foods
analysis).
176. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 247-48 (holding Miller does not apply to
private entities).  The Third Circuit was not bound by precedent in Tennessee Gas
because it had never heard an eminent domain case where a private entity was the
condemner. See id. (distinguishing Tennessee Gas from prior case law).  Tennessee
Gas attempted to cite cases to the contrary, but only provided examples where the
condemnor was the Federal Government. Id. at 248 (explaining how Third Circuit
could deny Miller as binding precedent).
177. See id. at 248-49 (providing rationale behind Third Circuit’s decision not
to extend Miller).
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ment is weak relative to other essential functions of the federal
government, such as “naval aviation activities.”178  As to the second
reason, the federal government is only concerned with “the spend-
ing of federal dollars” in eminent domain proceedings.179  Con-
demnation costs incurred by private entities are immaterial to the
federal government.180
C. Judge Chagares’s Dissent
The majority’s opinion drew a dissent from Circuit Judge
Chagares.181  The dissent’s interpretation of Miller was its principal
divergence from the majority.182  Judge Chagares argued Miller
bound the Third Circuit to determine just compensation under
federal law.183  According to Judge Chagares, Miller instructs that
federal law should be used to determine just compensation because
one’s right to just compensation is grounded in the Constitution.184
The dissent further reasoned the right to just compensation relates
to any exercise of the federal eminent domain power; the parties to
a case are irrelevant to the substantive determination of just
compensation.185
V. BIG SPENDERS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The majority acknowledged at the outset of its analysis that
interpretation of the NGA “is naturally a matter of federal
178. Id. (explaining natural gas pipelines are developed by private entities).
179. Id. at 249 (noting Federal Government seeks to minimize its own costs
from condemnation proceedings).  The Federal Government’s concern about
spending federal dollars is not translatable to private entities. Id. (distinguishing
between condemnation proceedings brought by government and private entities).
180. See id. (reinforcing that Miller does not resolve this case).
181. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 255-59 (Chagares, J., dissenting) (disagree-
ing with majority’s incorporation of state law as federal standard).
182. Id. at 255 (Chagares, J., dissenting) (asserting, “[R]esolution of the ques-
tion here presented begins and ends with the Miller decision”). See also id. at 247-
49 (expressing majority’s opinion that Miller does not resolve present case).
183. Id. at 256-57 (Chagares, J., dissenting) (citing Miller as binding U.S. Su-
preme Court precedent).
184. Id. (Chagares, J., dissenting) (explaining Judge Chagares’s overall
reasoning).
185. Id. at 257-58 (Chagares, J., dissenting) (explaining right to just compen-
sation is federal substantive right regardless of whom is exercising it).  The dissent
argues Miller does not limit its holding to condemnation actions brought by the
Federal Government. See id. (discussing relevance of parties’ identities in condem-
nation proceedings).  But to this end, the dissent recognizes that Miller does not
expressly extend its holding to private entities. See id. at 257 (noting Miller does
not discuss private entities).
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law.”186  But in order to resolve the NGA’s silence on which law
governs just compensation, the majority had to consider the rele-
vance of Miller before applying the Kimbell Foods factors.187  The ex-
amination of Miller necessarily led to distinguishing the interests of
public and private entities.188  This section examines the majority’s
distinction and employs Kelo as a point of comparison.189 Addition-
ally, this section discusses the displacement of state property laws
and the limited purview of the majority’s holding.190
A. Conflicting Interests
In its appellate brief, Tennessee Gas stated that King Arthur’s
argument “drive[s] an artificial wedge between federal condemna-
tions brought by the United States and federal condemnations
brought by private entities acting pursuant to congressionally dele-
gated authority.”191  Although Tennessee Gas’s statement is techni-
cally correct, it is unnecessarily accusatory and reflects a limited
understanding of the present case and its implications.192  The
Third Circuit correctly adopts the Kimble Foods analysis from King
Arthur’s appellate brief in order to distinguish between federal con-
demnations brought by the United States and federal condemna-
tions brought by private entities.193
186. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 247 (prefacing gap in statutory scheme of
NGA).
187. Id. at 243 (summarizing that NGA does not address “the remedies availa-
ble in the condemnation proceedings it allows”).  For a discussion of precedent
considered by the majority’s opinion, see supra notes 53-62, 75-96, 107-126 and
accompanying text.
188. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 247-49 (distinguishing Miller).
189. For further discussion of the majority’s distinction between the interests
of public and private entities, see infra notes 191-198 and accompanying text.  For
further discussion of Tennessee Gas in the context of Kelo, see infra notes 199-226
and accompanying text.
190. For further discussion of the displacement of state property laws, see in-
fra notes 227-232 and accompanying text.  For further discussion of the breadth of
the majority’s holding, see infra notes 233-246 and accompanying text.
191. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, L.L.C. at
10, Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres, 931 F.3d 237
(3d Cir. 2019) (No. 17-3700), 2018 WL 2746214 (critiquing King Arthur’s incorpo-
ration of state law as federal standard).
192. See generally Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 247-55 (holding federal con-
demnations brought by United States distinguishable from federal condemnations
brought by private entities acting pursuant to congressionally delegated authority).
193. See id. at 247, 250-55 (applying Kimble Foods factors to present case). See
also Brief of Appellant and Appendix Volume 1 Pages 1-22 at 5, 7-11, Tenn. Gas
Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres, 931 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2019)
(No. 17-3700), 2018 WL 2138056 (explaining application of Kimble Foods factors in
Columbia Gas was instructive).
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Moreover, the Third Circuit’s holding contemplates that the
federal government and private entities fulfill conflicting interests
by exercising eminent domain.194  The government must pursue
functions essential to the public interest on a budget funded by
“federal dollars.”195  Conversely, private entities act in their own in-
terest and pursue condemnation for the purpose of profit.196  Pri-
vate entities acting for-profit, therefore, are not necessarily entitled
to the same metric of just compensation as the federal government
acting in the public interest.197  The Third Circuit correctly empha-
sizes this distinction between the public and private sectors in its
analysis.198
B. Tennessee Gas in the Context of Kelo
The majority could have used the U.S. Supreme Court’s Kelo
opinion to enhance its argument.199  As a threshold matter, the fac-
tual dispute in Kelo is not particularly relevant to the issue in Tennes-
see Gas.200  Whereas Kelo discusses the “public use” component of
the Takings Clause, Tennessee Gas instead focuses on just compensa-
tion.201  Even though Kelo and Tennessee Gas ultimately address dif-
194. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 247-49 (differentiating between inter-
ests of private entities and Federal Government).
195. Id. at 249 (stating that Federal Government has strong interest in reduc-
ing condemnation costs).  The government only exercises its eminent domain
power to carry out “important governmental function[s].” See id. (explaining fed-
eral interest in condemnation proceedings).
196. Id. (noting private entities approach condemnation with different per-
spective than Federal Government).
197. See id. at 248-49 (reasoning Miller is distinguishable from present case).
198. See id. (distinguishing between objectives of Federal Government and
private entities).  The judiciary cannot concern itself with the profitability of pri-
vate entities. See id. at 248-49, 253 (noting lack of federal interest in condemnation
proceedings brought by private entities).
199. For a discussion of Kelo v. City of New London, see supra notes 97-106
and accompanying text.
200. Compare Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477-90 (2005) (deter-
mining whether economic development constitutes a public purpose) with Tenn.
Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 247-55 (analyzing whether state or federal law governs
determination of just compensation).
201. See id. (describing difference between Kelo and Tennessee Gas).  Indeed,
the public use component of the Takings Clause is not at issue in Tennessee Gas. See
id. (discussing main points of Kelo and Tennessee Gas).  Through the NGA, Con-
gress identifies that “the business of transporting and selling natural gas for ulti-
mate distribution to the public is affected with a public interest.” See Tenn. Gas
Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 242-43 (quoting Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (2005))
(establishing public purpose of natural gas pipelines).  Accordingly, the Third Cir-
cuit in Tennessee Gas does not have to reason through the meaning of “public use”
like the Supreme Court in Kelo. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477-90 (reasoning through
meaning of “public use” under Takings Clause); Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 241-
43 (summarizing Tennessee Gas could rightfully exercise eminent domain power).
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ferent issues, their discussions necessarily overlap because they are
rooted in the same subject matter: eminent domain.202
The majority in Tennessee Gas could have distinguished the facts
of Kelo to support its distinction of public and private interests.203
Kelo instructs that economic development may constitute a “public
use” for the purposes of the Takings Clause.204 Although the trans-
fer of property in Kelo occurs between two private parties, that trans-
fer relates to the federal interest because it promotes overall
economic development.205  Conversely, the exercise of eminent do-
main in Tennessee Gas is only constitutional because the NGA
presumes a public interest in the transfer and sale of natural gas.206
Neither the transfer nor sale of natural gas, however, serve some
greater federal interest such as economic development.207  There is
certainly an economic component to pipeline development, but it
involves the profitability of a private enterprise.208
Stated differently, the majority could have held Tennesse Gas
against Kelo to show the stark difference in objectives.209 Kelo dem-
onstrates that the federal government may even have a strong inter-
est in the dealings of private entities.210 Tennessee Gas establishes no
such relation to the federal interest.211  As Tennessee Gas fails to fit
within the Kelo framework, it becomes even clearer that there is no
federal interest in the development of natural gas pipelines.212
Consequently, the Third Circuit could have further supported its
202. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472 (noting issue in Kelo pertains to eminent do-
main); see also Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 241 (noting issue in Tennessee Gas
pertains to eminent domain).
203. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 248-49 (distinguishing between interests of
government and private entities).
204. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488-90 (stating Court’s holding).
205. See id. at 484 (stating, “Promoting economic development is a traditional
and long-accepted function of government.”).
206. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 242-43 (explaining Congressional find-
ings underpinning NGA).
207. See id. at 247-49 (explaining private interests differentiate present case
from Miller).
208. See id. at 249 (noting economic interests in pipeline development belong
solely to private entities).
209. Compare Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484-85 (explaining public purpose of economic
development) with Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 249 (explaining natural gas com-
panies pursue condemnation for profit).
210. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485-86 (stating private entities can contribute to govern-
ment’s pursuit of public purpose).
211. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 248-49 (explaining minimal federal inter-
est in pipeline development).
212. See id. at 249 (explaining minimal federal interest in pipeline
development).
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argument regarding the federal interest by distinguishing Kelo in
this respect.213
The majority could have concomitantly strengthened its hold-
ing by analyzing eminent domain procedure.214  In Tennessee Gas,
the pipeline company itself commenced the condemnation ac-
tion.215  The company held the power to exercise eminent domain
through its certificate of public convenience and necessity.216  In
Kelo, however, the NLDC brought the condemnation action on be-
half of the City of New London.217  Indeed, New London delegated
its eminent domain power to the NLDC.218  Even though the emi-
nent domain power is delegated to private entities in both cases,
Kelo infers that the NLDC is acting as an agent for the City of New
London.219  Accordingly, there is a stronger governmental interest
present in the Kelo condemnation action.220
This procedural distinction between Tennessee Gas and Kelo may
seem minor, but the holding of the present case rests on nuanced
analysis.221  Distinguishing the eminent domain procedure in Kelo
would also address an issue raised by the dissent in Tennessee Gas.222
The dissent argued there was no difference between “the Govern-
ment or a Government-delegatee” exercising the eminent domain
213. See id. at 247-49 (using federal interest argument to distinguish Miller).
214. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475 (explaining eminent domain procedure in Kelo);
see also Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 243 (explaining eminent domain procedure
in Tennessee Gas).
215. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 241 (stating Tennessee Gas filed instant
condemnation action).
216. For a discussion of the NGA’s delegation of the federal eminent domain
power, see supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
217. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475 (stating NLDC initiated condemnation
proceedings).
218. Id. at 495 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining New London’s delega-
tion of eminent domain power).
219. See id. at 475 (stating, “[T]he NLDC initiated the condemnation pro-
ceedings that gave rise to this case.”).  When stating that the NLDC initiated the
condemnation proceedings, the Court added a footnote linking the City and
NLDC. See id. at 523 n.3 (clarifying, “In the remainder of the opinion we will
differentiate between the City [of New London] and the NLDC only where neces-
sary.”).  From thereon, the Court references the City in place of the NLDC. See
generally id. at 475-90 (analyzing City’s economic development plan).  By referenc-
ing the City in place of the NLDC, the Court suggests that the NLDC is an agent
acting on behalf of the City. See id.
220. See id. at 484-85 (noting governmental interest in economic develop-
ment); see also Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 249 (noting governmental interest
when government is condemnor).
221. See, e.g., Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 252 (noting how NGA subtly con-
templates state law).
222. See id. at 255 (Chagares, J., dissenting) (critiquing majority’s standard for
measuring just compensation).
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power, subsequently inferring that Tennessee Gas is a “Govern-
ment-delegatee.”223  Yet the NLDC in Kelo appears to better exem-
plify the dissent’s vision of “Government-delegatee” because the
NLDC acts as an agent for the government.224  Tennessee Gas is
another step removed from the government by acting completely in
its own interest.225  One must question how Judge Chagares would
then categorize the NLDC in Kelo if he believed that Tennessee Gas
was a “Government-delegatee.”226
C. Property Rights as a Matter of State Law
The Fifth Circuit in Georgia Power discussed that the Supreme
Court is increasingly focused on “minimiz[ing] displacement of
state law.”227  The Sixth Circuit in Columbia Gas then built upon this
idea by reasoning that property rights have traditionally been de-
fined by state law.228  The present case notably quotes the Sixth Cir-
cuit in Columbia Gas, stating a federal rule regarding just
compensation “would at best merely superimpose a layer of prop-
erty right allocation onto the already well-developed state property
regime.”229  Although eminent domain is a federal power, the
Third Circuit necessarily draws upon Columbia Gas to reason that
state law should prevail.230  The present holding thus reflects that
any uniform federal rule would be framed by state property law,
indicating that creation of a uniform federal rule is redundant.231
223. See id. (inferring that Tennessee Gas exercises eminent domain power as
“Government-delegatee”).
224. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475 (stating NLDC was authorized to exercise emi-
nent domain “in the City’s name”) (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-188 (2005)).
225. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 249 (explaining that condemnor is
private entity in Tennessee Gas).
226. See id. at 255 (Chagares, J., dissenting) (noting eminent domain power
can be exercised by government or “government-delegatee”).
227. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Georgia Power, see supra
notes 108-113 and accompanying text.
228. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Exclusive Nat. Gas Storage Ease-
ment, 962 F.2d 1192, 1198 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating reason for adopting state law as
federal standard for determining just compensation).
229. Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 251 (quoting Columbia Gas, 962 F.2d at
1198) (explaining federal rules regarding property rights would obscure state
property regime).
230. See id. at 254 (implementing rationale from Columbia Gas).  Further, the
Third Circuit remarks that “when dealing with those powers left to the states, the
courts should tread gingerly.” Id. at 254 (quoting Ga. Power Co. v. Sanders, 617
F.2d 1112, 1125 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Fay, J., concurring)) (commenting on
powers left to states).
231. See id. at 251-55 (drawing upon persuasive case law).
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The Third Circuit, therefore, properly interprets persuasive case
law to support its holding.232
D. Circumscribed Holding
The Third Circuit does not set forth an unbounded holding in
Tennessee Gas.233  The present decision is seemingly limited to situa-
tions where private condemnors only face higher condemnation
costs as a result of incorporating state law.234  By distinguishing Na-
tional Railroad Passenger rather than overruling it, the Third Circuit
acknowledges that state law could impose unreasonable conditions
which would frustrate the NGA’s objectives.235  Although Tennessee
Gas was unable to provide other examples of burdensome state
laws, the Third Circuit still limits its holding to condemnation
costs.236
Importantly, the defined scope of the Third Circuit’s holding
undermines the dissent in Tennessee Gas.237  Relying on Miller, the
dissent argues federal law should be used to calculate just compen-
sation because “the right to compensation is based in the federal
Constitution.”238  But if higher condemnation costs are the only
consequence of incorporating state law, the dissent’s argument
then suggests the Constitution protects the financial interests of pri-
vate entities.239  In fact, the majority’s emphasis on the “federal in-
232. See id. at 251-52, 254 (applying reasoning from Columbia Gas).
233. Id. at 253 (noting potential for state compensation laws to conflict with
federal laws).
234. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 253-54 (explaining state law in present
case only affects condemnation costs).
235. See id. (contemplating operative facts of National Railroad Passenger).  The
Third Circuit determines that National Railroad Passenger sets forth legitimate con-
siderations that are inapposite to the present case. See id. (highlighting additional
statutory obstacles in National Railroad Passenger).  Pennsylvania law does not im-
pose additional statutory obligations on parties bringing condemnation proceed-
ings. See id. at 254 (distinguishing Pennsylvania law from state law applied in
National Railroad Passenger).
236. See id. at 254 (identifying National Railroad Passenger as Tennessee Gas’s
only viable argument regarding divergent state laws).  The Third Circuit’s holding
is seemingly limited to condemnation costs even though the court is “unpersuaded
by the theoretical possibility” that other divergent state laws exist. See id. (stating
court’s response to Tennessee Gas’s argument).
237. See id. at 257-58 (Chagares, J., dissenting) (advocating for federal law to
determine just compensation).  For a discussion of the scope of the holding in the
present case, see supra notes 141-143 and accompanying text.
238. Id. at 256 (Chagares, J., dissenting) (applying Supreme Court’s holding
in Miller to present case).
239. See generally Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 255-59 (Chagares, J., dissent-
ing) (concluding Constitution only permits federal law to govern substantive deter-
mination of just compensation).  For a discussion of the consequences of
incorporating state law, see supra notes 161-169 and accompanying text.
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terest” in condemnation actions circumvents this very
conclusion.240  By noting the minimal federal interest in condem-
nation actions brought by private entities, the majority restricts pri-
vate entities from realizing unwarranted financial protection by the
Constitution.241
Judge Chagares’s dissent in Tennessee Gas also identifies that
the U.S. Supreme Court neither extends Miller to private entities
nor restricts Miller to the federal government.242  Indeed, the
breadth of Miller’s authority was left ambiguously open.243  The ma-
jority resolved Miller’s indecision through tempered analysis of the
Kimbell Foods factors, but the dissent fails to cite any comparable
authority.244  Rather, Judge Chagares refuses to consider the pre-
sent issue beyond Miller and cites no case law in opposition to the
majority’s discussion of public and private interests.245  The dissent,
therefore, fails to adequately refute the majority’s limited
holding.246
VI. MONEY TROUBLES FOR PRIVATE ENTITIES: A FINANCIAL IMPACT
“Nothing in the NGA suggests that Congress was particu-
larly concerned with protecting natural gas companies
from the additional costs that varying state laws may im-
pose, or even with making natural gas companies’ transac-
tions streamlined or efficient.”247
240. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 248-49 (considering federal interest in
condemnation proceedings brought by private entities).
241. See id. (noting federal law is not default governing law because there is
minimal federal interest in condemnation proceedings brought by private
entities).
242. Id. at 257 (Chagares, J., dissenting) (explaining ambiguity of holding in
Miller).
243. See id. at 247-49 (noting Miller was never applied to private entities in
subsequent cases); id. at 257 (Chagares, J., dissenting) (noting lack of clarity in
Miller).
244. For a discussion of the majority’s analysis of the Kimbell Foods factors, see
supra notes 148-174 and accompanying text.
245. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 255-59 (Chagares, J., dissenting) (using
Miller as basis of argument).  Judge Chagares opines that the majority’s concern for
the federal interest is not determinative. See id. (referencing majority’s emphasis
of essentiality to government function and use of government funds).  To support
this conclusion, Judge Chagares only cites Miller and his own “view.” See id. at 258
(Chagares, J., dissenting) (stating, “But these concerns [regarding the federal in-
terest] are not determinative, in my view.”).
246. See id. at 258 (Chagares, J., dissenting) (summarizing opposition to ma-
jority’s arguments).
247. Id. at 253 (summarizing that holding will increase costs for natural gas
companies constructing pipelines).
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Tennessee Gas sets forth substantial cost implications for private
entities acting under the authority of the NGA.248  In the present
case alone, Tennessee Gas’s condemnation costs increased by ap-
proximately one-million dollars when the Third Circuit held state
law governed the substantive determination of just compensa-
tion.249  As other circuits have also held state law should govern the
determination of just compensation in condemnation proceedings
brought by private entities, and multiple states have statutorily re-
formed various “injustices of traditional just compensation law,” it
seems Tennessee Gas will impose significant financial liability on nat-
ural gas companies.250  The financial exposure of natural gas com-
panies is particularly concerning because pipelines often extend
across large expanses of land.251  As noted, Congress was uncon-
cerned by natural gas companies’ profitability when delegating its
eminent domain power through the NGA.252
The Third Circuit’s decision in Tennessee Gas leads one to ques-
tion the extent of consequential damages in this context.253  If
courts permit consequential damages to reflect the danger and en-
vironmental implications of pipelines, then just compensation
could become a substantial cost.254  Further, a natural gas company
will inevitably face many condemnation proceedings over the
course of a pipeline project.255  If those proceedings occur in states
with landowner-friendly laws, the financial consequences could be-
248. Id. at 242, 253 (incorporating state substantive law in present case in-
creases condemnation costs by approximately one million dollars).
249. See id. at 253 (stating effect of incorporating state law).
250. See Fegan, supra note 13, at 293-94 (providing information regarding stat-
utory reform of just compensation law at state level).  For a discussion of other
circuit court decisions to calculate just compensation under state law in condem-
nation proceedings brought by private entities, see supra notes 107-120 and accom-
panying text.
251. For a discussion of the expansive footprint of pipelines, see supra note
135 and accompanying text.
252. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 253 (referring to increased costs from
imposition of state law).  Moreover, the NGA was enacted to protect “the interests
of the public, including consumers and property owners.” Id. (relying on Supreme
Court precedent).
253. See id. at 244-45 (providing example of matters covered by consequential
damages).  For additional examples of matters covered by consequential damages,
see supra note 72 and accompanying text.
254. See Brief of King Arthur Estates, supra note 38, at 31-33 (describing envi-
ronmental implications of pipeline explosion).  For an explanation of consequent-
ial damages, see supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
255. See O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 168-69 (noting multiple condemnation
actions in one phase of single pipeline project).
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come unbounded.256  It is then possible that Tennessee Gas could
curb overbuilding of pipelines, which would significantly mitigate
their environmental impact.257  Among other externalities, fewer
pipelines would specifically reduce the risk of oil spills, water con-
tamination, and damage to wetlands and wildlife.258
The cost implications of Tennessee Gas could thereby instill a
new sense of corporate responsibility in the natural gas industry.259
If consequential damages serve as a vehicle for the quantification of
social costs, then just compensation would correct how natural gas
companies internalize the weight of their business decisions.260
Tennessee Gas, therefore, demonstrates a unique solution to the vari-
ous implications of pipelines: accountability rather than prohibi-
tion.261  As pipeline energy transfer is crucial to the operation of
society, it is imprudent to protest the existence of pipelines alto-
gether.262  Rather, the energy industry may be compelled to self-
regulate if faced with higher condemnation costs that reflect its
commercial interests.263  In conclusion, the financial ramifications
of Tennessee Gas may prompt the natural gas industry to realize
more of the social and environmental costs inherent to pipeline
construction.264
Spencer J. Miller*
256. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 244-45 (stating Pennsylvania law per-
mits recovery of consequential damages); id. at 253 (noting incorporating state law
in present case increases just compensation by approximately one million dollars).
257. For a discussion of the overbuilding of pipelines and its financial ratio-
nale, see supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the envi-
ronmental impact of pipelines, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
258. For a discussion of the specific environmental impacts of pipelines, see
supra note 9.
259. See Kunkel, supra note 140 (illustrating lack of profitability threatens via-
bility of pipeline projects).
260. See id. (analyzing that utility companies may not be able to recover all
pipeline construction costs); Kunkel, supra note 137 (explaining typical business
practice for natural gas companies to overbuild pipelines).
261. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 248-49 (indicating there is no federal
interest in condemnation actions brought by private entities).  The Third Circuit
rationalizes that private entities can pay higher condemnation costs when there is
no governmental interest in their action. See id. (quoting Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of
Pend Oreille City v. City of Seattle, 382 F.2d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 1967)) (differentiat-
ing private entities that pursue condemnation “for purposes of profit”).
262. For a discussion of the importance of the United States’ pipeline net-
work, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
263. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 249 (distinguishing that private entities
pursue condemnation for profit).
264. For information supporting this conclusion, see supra notes 247-263 and
accompanying text.
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